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CHRIST AND THE
CODE: THE DILEMMA
OF THE CHRISTIAN
ATTORNEY
JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI*
INTRODUCTION
In Christ and Culture,' a classic work on Christian ethics, H. Rich-
ard Niebuhr identified and evaluated a number of typical approaches
that Christians have taken towards culture in society at large, ranging
from the absolute rejection of secular culture in the name of Christ, to the
whole-hearted embrace of secular culture on behalf of Christ. This essay
is intended to adapt Niebuhr's typology and examine a number of ap-
proaches open to the Christian attorney as he or she seeks to balance the
loyalty to God with the professional duties owed to courts, clients, and
the public. How is the Christian attorney to render to Christ what is
Christ's and to the Code what is the Code's?
The word "Code" is used herein as shorthand to signify the basic
principles of professional ethics that govern the attorney's work in our
legal system. No detailed examination of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the more recent Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility will be performed, for despite their differences they
express a common vision of legal ethics. Each embodies what will be re-
ferred to in this article as the "standard paradigm of the lawyer's role."2
* Professor of Law and Assistant Director for Law and Religious Ethics, Center for Health
Policy & Ethics, Creighton University. J.D. 1977, Harvard Law School; M.Div. 1989, Yale
Divinity School. An earlier version of this essay was presented as a lecture at the Creighton
University School of Law in October 1988. A transcript of that lecture appeared in the
Spring 1990 edition of that school's alumni magazine.
H. R. NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951).
See Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73-81
(1980) (discussing standard paradigm of legal ethics); Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 672-75 (1978) (same); see also D. Luban,
34 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2
This paradigm is marked by two principles: zealousness and nonac-
countability. First, the lawyer is the zealous partisan of his or her client.
The client is the attorney's only master, and the attorney must do all that
is possible to achieve the client's lawful objectives despite any doubts
about the moral or social merits of the client's cause. Second, the lawyer
is neither professionally nor morally responsible for the means employed,
or the ends achieved, as long as the lawyer stays within the boundaries of
the law and the profession's own rules. "Nonaccountability" is meant to
insulate the attorney from moral scrutiny for his or her professional
actions.
With this in mind, let us turn to several models of the Christian's
relationship to the legal profession and to its standard paradigm.
I. CHRIST AGAINST THE CODE
To be explored first is an adaption of Niebuhr's first model, what he
called "Christ against culture."' The first letter of John is a good example
of the application of this model. It views the world as an evil place that
the Christian must avoid. Secular society is rejected for the sake of
Christ. This approach to culture is represented in some strands of monas-
ticism, in groups like the Mennonites, and in the works of Tertullian and
Leo Tolstoy.
When applied to the legal profession, the analogous model might be
termed "Christ against the Code." Let me illustrate it with a story. I had
been at divinity school only a few weeks when I met another student who
was also a lawyer. She told me that she had quit the practice of law be-
cause she could not square it with her Christian beliefs. She had grown
tired of being a "hired gun" whose job was to help clients avoid their
moral obligations. "I couldn't be both a lawyer and a Christian," she told
me. She even purported to have Biblical grounds for her view, in 1 Corin-
thians 6, where Paul expressed his dismay that Christians were bringing
lawsuits against each other. Paul wrote that Christians should not bring
each other before pagan courts, but should suffer wrong rather than seek
a legal remedy.
There are other ways to read this passage, of course, in light of par-
ticular pastoral problems confronting Paul at Corinth." Few observers
would adopt this student's reading, and fewer, if any, would consider the
practice of law "off limits" to Christians. Nevertheless, the story illus-
How Standard is the Standard Conception?, LAWYERS & JUSTICE 393-403 (1988) (funda-
mental concepts of ethics in legal practice).
' See H.R. NIEBUHR, supra note 1, at 45-82.
' See C.K. BARRETT, A COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS 134-143
(1968); W. ORR & J. WALTHER, I CORINTHIANS 193-99 (1976) (modern historical-critical read-
ing of I Corinthians 6).
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trates one model of the relationship between Christ and the Code. This
model bluntly insists that a Christian cannot be a lawyer. Christians are
to have as little to do with the structures and institutions of secular soci-
ety as possible. Between Christ and the Code is a gulf that cannot be
bridged. In its more moderate form, this model may motivate those who
seek to establish Christian tribunals, divorced from the normal legal pro-
cess, in which Christians can resolve disputes between themselves
through mediation and fraternal correction.
This model deserves respect for its single-minded devotion to follow-
ing Christ. At the same time, however, it risks forgetting that sin resides
not just in social structures but also in the human heart, and that God is
at work redeeming not only individuals but of all creation. It forgets that
Christ came to reconcile all things to God, and that Christians are called
to follow Him into the world and make disciples of all nations. Still, even
for those of us who do not advocate this model, it can serve as a caution-
ary note. Have we been too quick to accommodate our religious beliefs to
the dictates of our culture and our Codes? Have we sold out? Have we
bought in?
II. CHRIST IN HARMONY WITH THE CODE
This leads the reader to a second model. Niebuhr writes about the
"Christ of culture." According to this view, there is no tension at all be-
tween-the Gospel and the world. Instead, Christian values are thought to
be identical with the highest values of civilization. In the life and teach-
ings of Jesus, we see the ultimate goal toward which the world is directed.
Perhaps this model reached its culmination in nineteenth century
liberal Protestantism, which so often saw Jesus as a Victorian gentlemen
who came preaching liberty, tolerance, and evolutionary optimism. The
values of democratic society were equated with the Gospel's central
message.
As applied to the legal profession, one might call the analogous
model "Christ in harmony with the Code." Its adherents see no conflict
between their work as lawyers and their lives as Christians. When lawyers
act in accordance with the standard paradigm, they not only avoid legal
trouble, but they act in a manner that is "fundamentally right." The
Code itself embodies a morally appropriate vision of the lawyer's role.
Thus, it seems to raise no ethical problem if a lawyer makes an honest
I See H.R. NIEBUHR, supra note 1, at 83-115. Niebuhr also talks of "Christ above culture."
Id. at 116-48. That model views Christ's relation to culture in a way similar to the "Christ of
culture" model, but also holds that Christ gives to culture a new center of value. It is a value
expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas, among others. For our purposes, it need not be consid-
ered separately.
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witness look like a liar, or reveals only that portion of the truth favorable
to the lawyer's client, or defends what he or she knows to be an unjust
cause. Under these principles, what the Code says you can do, you can do,
and what the Code says you must do, you must do, so to speak.
It is this understanding that underlies the model of "Christ in har-
mony with the Code." There is no tension between Christian values and
professional life, because the practice of law serves noble ends, or is noble
in and of itself. By fulfilling the lawyer's role in the adversary system, the
attorney can be confident that he or she is in fact doing what is "good
and right" in the eyes of God.
This interpretation has its own strengths. Initially, it reminds us that
the whole world is the arena in which God's kingdom is being realized. It
recognizes that God is at work in institutions as well as in individuals.
Concurrently, however, it gives rise to a risk that whatever is acceptable
to the wider culture will come to be perceived as "God's will." No longer
would it be presumed that Christ sits in judgment upon culture. The end
result may be that "loyalty to contemporary culture [will have] so far
qualified the loyalty to Christ that he [will have] been abandoned in favor
of an idol called by [H]is name."
This model presents risks for the Christian lawyer as well. It can lead
the attorney to abdicate moral responsibility for his or her actions, which
in turn can lead to the collapse of the lawyer's moral universe. It is sus-
pected that society's recognition of this moral abdication results in much
of the criticism levied at the legal profession and to the scathing attacks
on lawyers as "prostitutes," "mouthpieces," or "hired guns."
III. CHRIST IN TENSION WITH THE CODE
Cynics and skeptics might assume that all lawyers fit the description
of this second model. But the author's experience is that many attorneys
are aware of the unavoidable tension between Christ and the Code. They
wish to be both good people and good lawyers, and come to realize that
the two may not be identical. It is suggested that once an attorney begins
to reflect upon the problem of serving two masters, the attorney no longer
fits within this second model. Instead, a third model needs to be consid-
ered, based upon what Niebuhr called "Christ and culture in paradox.
' '7
This third paradigm lies between the first two. The first, the reader
will recall, rejects the secular world as incompatible with Christian values.
The second accepts the secular world as embodying Christian values. Our
third model avoids this "either/or" for a "both/and" approach, but it does
have some similarities to each. Like the first model, it admits that human
6 Id. at 110.
7 See id. at 149-89.
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culture is sinful, and to be involved with it leads to sin. Like the second,
it insists that our sinful world is sustained and redeemed by a loving God.
Christian theologians who favor this model are fond of paradoxical
language. They juxtapose law and grace, God's wrath and God's mercy.
They describe the individual as simultaneously both saint and sinner.
This supposition can be seen variously in the theology of Augustine, Mar-
tin Luther and Reinhold Niebuhr. Christians inhabit two worlds, a pri-
vate realm in which they relate to God as individuals and are bound by
the teachings of Christ, and a public realm in which they live and work
and must make accommodations to the sinfulness of the human condi-
tion. Christ and culture are in conflict, yet each must be obeyed. Hence,
the Christian is subject to two moralities, and must live "precariously and
sinfully in the hope of a justification which lies beyond history."8
This model has its own advantages. It is frank about the moral ambi-
guities and the interwoven joys and tragedies of everyday life. It captures
the central insight of the Reformers-that nothing we can do can make us
right with God. That, however, is the whole point. While we were yet
sinners, Christ died for us and reconciled us to God.
As applied to the legal profession, one might call the analogous
model "Christ in tension with the Code." Here, the attorney admits that
sometimes he or she does things that a non-lawyer should not do. The
attorney admits that "ordinary" morality would sometimes condemn the
attorney's actions. The lawyer argues, however, that everyday morality is
not applicable to professional life. The attorney's professional obligations
give rise to a unique set of concerns. As an agent of the client, the lawyer
should be judged solely by the rules of legal ethics embodied in the Code.
According to Richard Wasserstrom, the result is that the lawyer becomes,
in essence, an "amoral technician," who inhabits a moral world far sim-
pler and less ambiguous than the moral world of everyday life.9 It be-
comes easy to "turn aside so many ostensibly difficult moral dilemmas
and decisions with the reply: but that is not my concern; my job as a
lawyer is not to judge the rights and wrong[s] of the client or the cause; it
is to defend as best I can my client's interests." 0
As in our second model, the appeal to the principles of zealousness
and nonaccountability remain. But there is a difference. The individual in
the second model has no doubts that a good lawyer can also be a good
Christian, while the lawyer in the third model hopes that it is possible to
be both, fears that it is not, and knows no way out of the dilemma. The
result can be a kind of "moral schizophrenia." The attorney compartmen-
S Id. at 43.
See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 2-15
(1975) (examining ways in which attorney-client relationship affects lawyer's moral stance).
10 Id. at 9.
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talizes his or her life. The public and private dimensions of life are sepa-
rated and the attorney concludes that his or her Christian values apply
only to the private. On the professional side of life the lawyer insists that
he or she be judged only by the rules of the legal profession.
Such a situation is inherently unstable. Something has to give, and it
is no surprise that studies indicate that if a lawyer argues positions that
conflict with personal values, over time those values will change." Taken
to an extreme, the role can actually absorb the personality. Consider as
parallel a distressing epitaph eyed in a Scottish cemetery: "Here lies John
McDonald, born a man, died a grocer."
IV. CHRIST TRANSFORMING THE CODE
As a final model, Niebuhr writes of "Christ transforming culture.
1'
2
In some ways this resembles our third model. It also recognizes that cul-
ture is sinful, yet acknowledges that Christians have obligations to cul-
ture. Unlike the third model, however, this one claims that the Christian
need not be immobilized between the demands of Christ and the de-
mands of culture. The Christian is one under the power of Christ, and
Christ is the one who redirects and reinvigorates our world. The Gospel is
seen as penetrating all of life, converting both people and institutions.
This model is exemplified in Christian theology in the philosophies of Au-
gustine and John Calvin.
It is suggested that this model has a strong Biblical foundation as
well. Jesus teaches that the kingdom of God has arrived. It is presently in
our midst, growing like a mustard seed, penetrating all of life. It is here,
but it is not yet fully realized."3
Lawyers who maintain analogous views conform to the model I will
call "Christ transforming the Code." Such talk is admittedly imprecise.
Critics of Niebuhr have commented at length on the slipperiness of terms
like "transformation" and "conversion." Vital questions remain unan-
swered. What does it mean to say that Christ is at work transforming
culture? What counts as evidence? And how would this apply to the work
" See Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers from Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's
Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 31-32 (1980).
" See H.R. NIEBUHR, supra note 1,'at 190-229.
13 See, e.g., Matthew 13 (parables). The meaning of the Kingdom of God in Jesus' teaching
and in Christian theology is too large a topic to explore here. For a concise overview, see T.
GROOME, CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 35-55 (1980). According to Groome, most modern
commentators would agree that "the Kingdom has already come definitively in Jesus Christ;
it will come completely and with newness at the end of time; but its working out is an
intrahistorical reality and our present time has something vital to contribute to its final
perfection." Id. at 44-45. The stress on the working out of the Kingdom in the present fits
nicely with the "Christ transforming culture" model.
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of lawyers?
Despite these difficulties, this model at least recognizes that Christ is
the Lord of all, even those in the legal profession, and that Christians are
called to serve Him in their private and professional lives. Moreover, this
model has the great advantage of rejecting the artificial separation of life
into private and public realms, with religion limited to the former. The
Christian attorney is to bring his or her values into the workplace, with
the hope and trust that these values might revitalize and transform the
lawyer's relationships and, ultimately, the profession itself. The lawyer is
not a "hired gun," or an "amoral technician," and cannot avoid moral
responsibility for his or her actions by resorting to professional rules and
roles. The attorney is a "moral agent," whose actions have moral conse-
quences for which the attorney is responsible, not just personally and to
others, but ultimately to God.
This model is unfamiliar to most attorneys. Its implications are un-
certain. It seems to threaten traditional attorney-client relations. Let me
try to advance the discussion by briefly sketching three avenues for reflec-
tion. Each is an attempt to realize the goal of a legal profession trans-
formed by the saving power of Christ.
A. The Lawyer's Vocation
First, it is suggested that we need to take a fresh look at the concept
of "vocation." A "professional" is what one professes to be, but a vocation
is what one is called to be, what God calls one to be. Luther and Calvin
were aware that any occupation can be a calling if its primary motive is to
serve God and neighbor. In an insightful article, Charles Kammer has ar-
gued that the concept of vocation can serve as a check upon the tendency
of professionals like doctors and lawyers to prefer their own self-interest
to the public good."" According to Kammer, a profession that understands
itself as a vocation "can escape many of the problems generated by ...
narrow self-interest because it is governed by a higher vision of the pur-
poses the profession is intended to serve.' As the professional is liber-
ated from self-interest, he or she is set free to serve others. Work becomes
an avenue of discipleship to Christ. "Our vocation becomes that of loving
our neighbor through our occupation."' 6
Still, several questions come to mind. Does it make sense to talk of a
"lawyer's vocation"? In what ways can a lawyer's work be a vehicle of
service to God and neighbor? More concretely, how would viewing law as
" See Kammer, Vocation and the Professions, 1981 ANN. SOC'Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 151, 151
(T. Ogletree, ed.).
" Id. at 174-75.
"o Id. at 170.
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a vocation affect the attorney's relationship to clients, courts, and adver-
saries? What would be the impact on the standard paradigm of legal eth-
ics and the principles of zealousness and nonaccountability?
B. The Lawyer as Prophet
A second approach would be to focus on the traditional Biblical no-
tions of priest and prophet. Sociologists have been quick to point out that
the legal system plays a cultic role in society. It is the mechanism by
which society resolves conflicts that threaten the social fabric. It has its
own myths and rituals, its own language, its own garb. To the layperson,
the legal system can be a mysterious dispenser of blind justice. In the
"temple" of the law, the courthouse, lawyers and judges are the priests.
Yet we know from the Scripture-from Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and
Jesus-that priests can also be prophets. Lawyering can be seen not only
as a priestly profession, but as an avenue for prophetic ministry.
Generally speaking, a prophet interprets the signs of the time in the
light of faith, and speaks God's word for that time and place. The
prophet criticizes people and institutions, but not as an outsider. The
prophet stands with the sinful as one of the sinful, confronting the terri-
ble majesty of God's justice. At the same time, the prophet holds out a
vision of God's mercy and faithfulness, and of the new life possible on the
other side of judgment. The task of the prophet "is to bring to expression
the new realities against the more visible area of the old order."'" The
prophet offers an alternative vision of reality based upon God's freedom
and God's will for justice."8
What would it mean to claim a prophetic role for lawyers? What is
the alternative perception of reality to which they might point? First and
foremost, the acceptance of a prophetic role would mean a new commit-
ment by lawyers to the just distribution of legal services. In today's
America, the poor have little access to legal counsel, and the middle-class
is finding it increasingly difficult to afford legal assistance. As long as le-
gal representation is a commodity to be purchased like any other, those
who can afford lawyers will have them, and those who cannot will be left
without the means to assert their legal rights. As the old law school adage
goes, a right without a remedy is no right at all. Legal rights without the
means to enforce them are a sham.
Although there have been a few notable exceptions, by and large,
lawyers in America have served as defenders of wealth, power, and en-
trenched privilege. An appreciation of their prophetic role would spark a
new concern for the weak and poor, those who have little voice in today's
" W. BRUEGGEMANN, THE PROPHETIC IMAGINATION 23 (1978).
18 See id. at 110.
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system. It would lead lawyers to question the prevailing Assumption that
pro bono work is a deed of charity rather than a duty of justice.
Furthermore, this prophetic role shines new light on the ethical
problems that lawyers confront in their daily practice. A heightened sense
of social justice, for example, would force attorneys to reexamine their
cherished commitment to the standard paradigm. Perhaps unqualified
loyalty to the client produces injustice and social harm. Perhaps attor-
neys should no longer be immune from moral criticism for the ends they
achieve or the means they employ. The prophetic dimension raises dis-
turbing questions about the social and personal costs of the principles of
zealousness and nonaccountability.
A prophetic role for Christian attorneys would build upon the rich
legacy of the Hebrew prophets. Amos, Isaiah, and the others refused to
separate worship of God from the duty to help those who could not help
themselves. They attacked all who trampled the poor, turned aside the
needy, exploited the weak, and corrupted the legal process. Indeed, the
plea of Isaiah could almost serve as a credo for the Christian attorney:
"Make justice your aim; redress the wronged, hear the orphan's plea, de-
fend the widow."' 9 Jeremiah put it succinctly-to know God is to do jus-
tice to the poor and needy.
20
C. An Ethic of Care
Finally, one might follow the lead of Thomas Shaffer, and begin to
explore a vision of lawyering which puts less stress on the dictates of posi-
tion and more on the duty to care.2
The conventional wisdom too often views lawyers as possessing only
two options when they have moral qualms about their client's case. The
lawyer must commit to do everything legally possible to win for the cli-
ent-or withdraw from the case. This view of the lawyer-client relation-
ship assumes that lawyers and clients are morally isolated from each
other, and do not influence each other. Neither is open to change. Reality
is quite to the contrary. An ethic of care recognizes that lawyers and cli-
ents are not morally autonomous. They are not islands unto themselves.
As they come together they become mutually dependent. In their depen-
dence each is open to change. Conversion is possible. What Buber called
Isaiah 1:17.
'0 Jeremiah 22:16.
11 T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 4-12, passim (1981). The author is
indebted to Shaffer for much of the discussion of the ethic of care, especially Chapter 3,
"The Ethics of Care". See id. at 21-33; see also R. JACK & D.C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS passim
(1989) (arguing lawyers need to develop a "morality of care" to supplement their traditional
commitment to rights and duties).
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the "I-Thou" relation can emerge.22 Openness, risk and vulnerability
characterize such a relationship.
The recognition of an ethic of care would produce an epochal shift in
lawyering, away from the amoral provision of technical assistance, to-
wards service to the client as a person. Shaffer writes:
The broader professional consequences could be revolutionary: Lawyers
would have to become morally attentive, attending, that is, to the persons of
their clients as much as to the problems clients bring to them. Law students
would come to insist on education which trains them in the skills of sincer-
ity, congruence, and acceptance. Every level of the legal enterprise would
come again to think of moral development as part of its task, all toward a
professional ethic of receiving as well as giving-of unfurling rather than
imposing, to use Buber's phrase. 3
Such an ethic ultimately rests upon the conviction that God is at
work in all human relationships, and therefore all things are possible.
God is the "invisible third party" in every human encounter.
Again, we need to consider the impact of such a view on traditional
attorney-client relationships. Would an ethic of care intrude upon client
autonomy? How would it inform the attorney's approach to particular
ethical duties like confidentiality? Would lawyers who adopted an ethic of
care become more or less committed to the principles of zealousness and
nonaccountability? Is an ethic of care even possible? Perhaps an attorney
can have a relationship of openness and vulnerability with a flesh-and-
blood client, but what about the attorney who represents a corporation, a
union, a pension board?
An ethic of care is inherently tentative and open-ended. It provides
no definitive answers to ethical questions, because only in the give-and-
take of the relationship can the morally responsible course of action be
discerned. Nevertheless, it deserves further exploration by those who seek
an integration of the personal values and professional life of the attorney.
Is it actually an attempt to bring the force of the Gospel message to ,bear
upon the lawyer-client relationship? Here, perhaps, is the seed for a new
understanding of the Christian lawyer, a hired gun no longer, but (dare I
say it?) a minister to his or her clients.
CONCLUSION
The preceding describes but a few of the ways in which Christian
attorneys could begin to explore the model of "Christ transforming the
Code." My guess is that such a model may lead to some surprising results.
" See M. BUBER, I AND THOU passim (R. Smith trans. 2d ed. 1958). See as well the thought-
ful discussion of Buber's ethics in T. SHAFFER, supra note 21, at 28-33.
" T. SHAFFER, supra note 21, at 30.
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There may be times when we find ourselves less committed to the single-
minded pursuit of our client's interests, while at other times we may find
ourselves more deeply committed to the client than ever before. It is pos,
sible, for example, that the difficult question of how an attorney can de-
fend a client will be replaced by the equally troubling question of why
attorneys do not defend the guilty more often.2' We may find ourselves
questioning and even discarding many of our cherished assumptions
about the attorney's professional role. That at least should not surprise
us. As Deitrich Bonhoeffer reminded us, when Christ summons us, he
bids us come and die."' He calls us to die to our illusions of power and
importance, to the idolatrous demands of our culture, and to the vain
promises and false security offered by our social and professional rules. If
we are serious about transforming ourselves and our profession, then we
can hardly avoid these "little dyings." We know that there is no growth
without change, no conversion without repentance, and no Easter Sunday
without Good Friday.
" See id. at 56.
25 See D. BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 79 (rev. ed. 1959).

